International Statebuilding Initiatives at Preventing the Return of Armed Conflict in Countries Recovering from War – Executive Summary

This lengthy project was generously funded by Milt Lauenstein. The report assesses the efforts of the international community to consolidate peace in countries recovering from armed conflict. Its findings are informed by extensive financial data harvested from the online archives of major foreign policy and development actors, the latest academic and policy literature on the subject, and the quantitative perspective employed by the Fragile States Index. Thus, the report not only provides a fresh and unprecedented perspective on this under-research topic, but also constitutes a significant contribution to contemporary debates on diplomacy, international intervention, and development in post-conflict states.

The Executive Summary of my findings is presented below, while the full report can be found on the publications page of this website.

Executive Summary

In Burundi, the African Union and the United Nations (UN) spent over $900 million on peacekeeping operations before the war was finally ended in 2006. Between 2006 and 2019, the international community spent at least $1 billion on strengthening the Burundian state ($7 per citizen per annum). Despite such commitments, the Fragile States Index (FSI) indicates that every sector of the Burundian state was less stable in 2019 than it was in 2006.

The failure to build a stable state in Burundi is attributed to:

1. The determination of the late President Nkurunziza and his political party, the CNDD-FDD, to consolidate their control over Burundi. They proved adept at utilising the international community’s reliance on Burundian contributions to multilateral peace operations to deflect criticism while resources intended for statebuilding were diverted to strengthening their grip on power.
2. The shortcomings of the Arusha Agreement, the recalcitrance of its signatories to adhere to its principals, and the failure of the international community to recognise and respond to these developments.
3. An unsuccessful internationally led Security Sector Reform (SSR) and military integration process, a failure to separate the military leadership from the party of government, and the use of security services by the government to repress political opposition.

In Chad, the European Union and the UN spent approximately $2.75 billion on peacekeeping operations between 2008 and 2010. Between 2010 and 2019, the international community spent at least $1.9 billion on statebuilding initiatives ($14 per citizen per annum), however this figure does not include contributions from France (likely the largest donor) as such data is not publicly available. These efforts have done little to bring stability to Chad: According to the FSI, in 2019 the Chadian state was as fragile as it was in 2010.

This is the result of:

1. The leadership of President Déby and his regime of ‘untouchables.’ They have openly appropriated resources intended for development and used them to build a powerful military, while also enriching themselves. Such actions appear to have been wilfully ignored by the international community due to Chadian contributions to regional security organisations and operations.
2. Owing to a deeply flawed SSR and military integration process, Chad has four armed forces, the largest and most powerful of which is Déby’s personal guard. These forces are unprofessional, act with impunity, and are employed to repress political opposition. They have also committed several atrocities while serving with the UN.
3. Pervasive instability across almost all of Chad’s borders has created a highly unfavourable environment for building an effective and sustainable state. This has made Chad a critical regional power despite its failure to perform the basic functions of statehood.

In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN spent $3.75 billion on its peacekeeping mission during the war. Additional security operations costing over $2 billion were carried out unilaterally by France. Between 2011 and 2019, the international community spent at least $2.8 billion on statebuilding initiatives in Côte d’Ivoire ($14.5 per citizen per annum). Like Chad, France was likely the largest donor, but these figures do not include its contributions as they are unavailable. According to the FSI, the Ivoirian state has made modest but sustained progress toward stability. However, the economy remains unstable and in recent years the security sector has displayed concerning signs of fragility.

The development of the Ivoirian state is due to:

1. President Ouattara, who secured extensive international assistance to support his efforts to bring stability to post-war Côte d’Ivoire. However, his dominance has undermined many aspects of the statebuilding process, such as establishing the rule of law.
2. The international statebuilding effort focused on kick-starting Côte d’Ivoire’s formerly prosperous economy. This stimulated an impressive growth rate and created a strong base from which the Ivorian state can draw revenue. However, uneven economic development threatens to reignite many of the tensions that caused the war.
3. The locally led SSR and military integration process favoured Ouattara’s wartime supporters and failed to limit the power of regional military figures. The impunity of such figures has hindered broader reconciliation efforts. Poor living conditions and unpaid wages has led to several mutinies in recent years.

In Nepal, neither the UN nor any regional organisations deployed a multilateral peacekeeping operation during the war. Between 2006 and 2019, at least $1.05 billion was spent by the international community on strengthening the Nepalese state ($3 per citizen per annum), almost a third of which was allocated in 2018 and 2019. According to the FSI, this has contributed to a significant reduction in the fragility of the Nepalese state. Indeed, the Nepalese case represents the most successful transition toward stability in this assessment by a considerable margin.

The success of efforts to strengthen the Nepalese state are the product of:

1. A successful SSR and military integration process, in which Maoist combatants were integrated into the national army and renumerations from extensive commitments to multilateral peacekeeping operations have been invested into the professional development of the military.
2. The consensus shared across the Nepalese political arena that building a functioning constitutional democracy following the abolishment of the monarchy was the way forward, and the shared commitment to ensuring that the statebuilding process was locally led.
3. A functioning democracy in which government alternation is commonplace. This prevented any individual or political party from exerting too much authority over the statebuilding process and ensured that it developed in line with political realities.

International statebuilding initiatives have failed to bring stability to Burundi or Chad. Côte d’Ivoire shows promise, while Nepal demonstrates that such efforts can be successful. The cases reveal that:

1. Local actors should not be underestimated. In Nepal they proved to be more than capable of leading efforts to build and strengthen the state with limited international support, while in Burundi and Chad much greater levels of support were subverted in order to consolidate the power of the ruling administration.
2. Getting SSR and military integration right is vital to any effort to build or strengthen a state. In Burundi and Chad, considerable international resources were employed to build the armies of authoritarian regimes rather than professional armed forces serving the state. These armies are used to repress opposition and represent a threat to peace during future transitions of power.
3. The international footprint must be light but sustained when the objective is to build a resilient, self-governing, and sustainable state in a country recovering from war. The cases of Burundi, Chad, and to some extent, Côte d’Ivoire, show that statebuilding initiatives are easily subverted when the international community has little in the way of a formal presence in the recipient country. Similarly, they also demonstrate that successfully building a state is not simply a question of resources: Burundi received twice as much assistance as Nepal, while Chad and Côte d’Ivoire received at least four times as much. The Nepalese case proves that a small but sustained presence (manifested in this case by a small UN political mission) can help to achieve much more with far fewer resources.